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In joint action, multiple people coordinate their actions to perform a task together. This
often requires precise temporal and spatial coordination. How do co-actors achieve
this? How do they coordinate their actions toward a shared task goal? Here, we provide
an overview of the mental representations involved in joint action, discuss how co-actors
share sensorimotor information and what general mechanisms support coordination
with others. By deliberately extending the review to aspects such as the cultural context
in which a joint action takes place, we pay tribute to the complex and variable nature of
this social phenomenon.
Keywords: joint action, social interaction, action prediction, joint attention, culture, sensorimotor communication,
coordination
ACTING IN A SOCIAL WORLD
People rarely act in isolation; instead, they constantly interact with and coordinate their actions
with the people around them. Examples of such ‘joint actions’ range from carrying a sofa
with multiple people (Figure 1), building a toy brick tower with a child, playing basketball, to
performing a musical duet. Accordingly, an often-used definition describes joint action as “any
form of social interaction whereby two or more individuals coordinate their actions in space and
time to bring about a change in the environment” (Sebanz et al., 2006, p. 70). Especially in light
of a long research tradition that focused on the psychological (neuro)cognitive and perceptual
processes of individuals, it is crucial to realize the importance of studying these processes in the
social environment in which they typically occur.
COORDINATION MECHANISMS
Agents involved in joint action make use of different mechanisms to support their coordination.
These include forming representations about, and keeping track of, a joint action goal and
the specific to-be-performed tasks. Some coordination mechanisms depend on sensorimotor
information shared between co-actors, thereby making joint attention, prediction, non-verbal
communication, or the sharing of emotional states possible. General mechanisms, which depend
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FIGURE 1 | Two people carrying a heavy sofa together face the challenge of coordinating their actions in a temporally and spatially precise manner.
to a lesser degree on sharing information online, influence
and support coordination such as when co-actors rely on
‘coordination smoothers’ or conventions to act together. This
article provides an overview of these coordination mechanisms
(Table 1) and their role for joint action. We focus on intentional
real-time joint action, in which adult co-actors share a physical
space and where coordination may require high temporal
precision. It therefore complements work on rhythmic or
unintentional coordination (Repp and Keller, 2004; Schmidt
and Richardson, 2008), verbal communication (Clark, 1996;
Brennan et al., 2010), strategic cooperation (Schelling, 1960), and
coordination in more temporally or spatially remote joint tasks.
MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS IN JOINT
ACTION
The following subsections discuss the mental representations
underlying joint action, such as representing and monitoring the
joint action goal and agents’ specific tasks.
Joint Action Goal
To successfully perform a joint action, actors need to plan their
own action in relation to the desired outcome and/or their co-
actor’s actions. For example, Kourtis et al. (2014) showed that
the neural signature of action planning is modulated when one’s
own action is part of a joint plan, e.g., when clinking glasses
with another person, compared to performing a corresponding
TABLE 1 | Overview of different coordination mechanisms supporting joint
action, along with a set of examples.
Coordination mechanism Example
Mental representations in joint action
Joint action goal Relocating a sofa by lifting and moving it
together
Task (co-)representation Carrying a sofa forward or backward
Monitoring Noticing errors in a co-actor’s performance
Sharing sensorimotor information
Joint attention and shared gaze Being mutually aware of an obstacle in the way
Sensorimotor prediction Predicting a co-actor’s movement direction
Sensorimotor communication Pushing a co-actor into a certain direction
Haptic coupling Feeling a co-actor pushing the sofa
Multisensory processing Integrating information from different senses
Emotion understanding and
expression
Realizing how exhausted a co-actor is
General mechanisms supporting coordination
Coordination smoothers Distributing the task of moving forward or
backward
Affordances Being constrained by available space and a
co-actor’s physical strength
Conventions and culture Appreciating rules about who carries more
weight
solo or bimanual action. According to a minimal joint action
account, agents intending to perform a coordinated action
with others minimally represent the joint action goal and
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the fact that they will achieve this goal with others (Vesper
et al., 2010). This does not presuppose high-level interlocking
mental representations (cf. Bratman, 1992), and might therefore
form the basis for joint action in young children (Butterfill,
2012). Moreover, joint action goals influence the acquisition
of new skills: after learning to play melodies in a joint action
context (i.e., duets), piano novices played better when later
coordinating toward the shared action goal (the duet) compared
to their own action goal (the melody; Loehr and Vesper, 2016).
Further evidence for the role of goal representations in joint
action comes from work on complementary action (Sartori
and Betti, 2015) showing that, in contrast to an imitation
context, performance of an action is facilitated if the goal is to
complement someone else (van Schie et al., 2008; Poljac et al.,
2009).
Task (Co-)representation
In many joint actions, detailed knowledge about another’s task
is available and people tend to co-represent these tasks, even
if detrimental to their own action performance. For instance,
one might be influenced by others’ stimulus-response rules in
reaction-time tasks (Sebanz et al., 2003, 2005) or automatically
memorize word list items relevant only to another person
(Eskenazi et al., 2014). When acting together with others toward
a joint goal, representing a co-actor’s task can be beneficial
as it enables agents to predict others’ actions and to integrate
them into their own action plan. For example, knowledge about
a co-actor’s task can be useful if access to online perceptual
information about the co-actor’s action is unavailable such that
monitoring the co-actor’s unfolding action and continuously
adjusting in an appropriate manner is not possible. This was
shown in a study where dyads coordinated forward jumps of
different distances such that they would land at the same time
(Vesper et al., 2013). Although co-actors could not see or hear
each other’s actions, task knowledge about the distance of each
other’s jump was sufficient to predict the partner’s timing and
adjust their own jumping accordingly.
Monitoring
While performing a joint task, co-actors typically monitor
their task progress to determine whether the current state
of the joint action and the desired action outcome are
aligned (Vesper et al., 2010; Keller, 2012). For example,
one might keep track of how far a jointly carried sofa
has been moved and whether all task partners are equally
contributing to lifting the weight. Monitoring is useful to
detect mistakes or unexpected outcomes in one’s own or one’s
partner’s performance, enabling one to quickly react and adapt
accordingly. Performance monitoring in social contexts involves
specific processes and brain structures such as brain areas
involved in mentalizing and perspective-taking, e.g., medial
prefrontal cortex (van Schie et al., 2004; Newman-Norlund et al.,
2009; Radke et al., 2011). Findings from an EEG experiment
with expert musicians (Loehr et al., 2013) indicate that the
neural signature associated with the detection of unexpected
musical outcomes is similar irrespective of whether an auditory
deviation arises from one’s own or the partner’s action. This
suggests that co-actors monitor the actions toward the overall
joint goal in addition to their own individually controlled
part.
SHARING SENSORIMOTOR
INFORMATION
The following subsections provide an overview of different
ways in which co-actors share sensorimotor information to
support joint action through joint attention, prediction, non-
verbal communication, or sharing emotions.
Joint Attention and Shared Gaze
Others’ eye movements are an important source of information
about what others see and about their internal states (Tomasello
et al., 2005). For example, when jointly moving a sofa, co-
actors may use mutual gaze to infer whether everyone is aware
of a potential obstacle that is in their way (e.g., a curious
dog). Joint attention relies on co-actors’ ability to monitor each
other’s gaze and attentional states (Emery, 2000). For instance,
when synchronizing actions, co-actors divide attention between
locations relevant for their own and for their co-actor’s goal
(Kourtis et al., 2014; see Böckler et al., 2012; Ciardo et al., 2016
for similar results using different tasks), and sharing gaze affects
object processing by making attended objects motorically and
emotionally more relevant (Becchio et al., 2008; Innocenti et al.,
2012; Scorolli et al., 2014). Moreover, in a joint search task, co-
actors who mutually received information about each other’s gaze
location via different sensory modalities (i.e., vision, audition,
and touch) searched faster than without such information
(Brennan et al., 2008; Wahn et al., 2015). Together, these findings
demonstrate the important role of gaze information for joint
action.
Sensorimotor Prediction
Predicting others’ actions and their perceptual consequences
is often important for joint action. When moving a sofa
together with someone, individuals need to predict what the
other is going to do next in order to adapt their own action
and thereby facilitate coordination. It has been postulated
that action prediction relies on individuals’ own motor plans
and goals such that when an interaction partner’s actions
are observed, this activates representations of corresponding
perceptual and motor programs in the perceiver (Prinz,
1997; Blakemore and Decety, 2001; Wolpert et al., 2003;
Wilson and Knoblich, 2005; Catmur et al., 2007). At a
functional level, action prediction can be explained in terms of
internal forward models that generate expectations about the
sensory consequences of partner-generated actions based on an
individual’s own motor experience. At a neurophysiological level,
the mirror system (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010) provides a
plausible mechanism linking action observation, imagination,
and representation of others’ actions with motor performance.
Although motor prediction has mostly been studied in action
observation, some evidence demonstrates that it supports joint
action by allowing precise temporal coordination (Vesper
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et al., 2013, 2014) and that it is modulated by own action
experience. For instance, Tomeo et al. (2012) found that
expert soccer players, compared to novices, more effectively
predict the direction of a kick from another person’s body
kinematics (see Aglioti et al., 2008; Mulligan et al., 2016,
for similar results with basketball and dart players). Action
prediction also affects perception (Springer et al., 2011) as
predictions based on knowing another person’s task can bias
how their subsequent actions are perceived (Hudson et al.,
2016a,b). Due to the overlap of own and others’ sensorimotor
representations, additional processes are needed to keep a
distinction between self and other (Novembre et al., 2012;
Sowden and Catmur, 2015) and to inhibit the tendency to
automatically imitate another’s (incongruent) action (Ubaldi
et al., 2015).
Sensorimotor Communication
In some joint actions, it is useful to not only gather
information about other people but to actively provide others
with information about one’s own actions. Accordingly, co-
actors might adjust the kinematic features of their action (e.g.,
velocity or movement height) in order to make their own
actions easier to predict for another person. Thus, ‘sensorimotor
communication’ is characterized by having both an instrumental
(e.g., pushing a sofa) and a communicative goal (e.g., informing a
partner about one’s movement direction). This facilitates action
prediction by disambiguating different motor intentions for
the observer (Pezzulo et al., 2013), thereby relying on people’s
ability to detect even subtle kinematic cues (Sartori et al.,
2011). Studies on sensorimotor communication typically involve
tasks where a ‘leader’ participant has information about an
aspect of a joint task that a ‘follower’ participant lacks and
so the follower has to rely on the leader’s action cues to act
appropriately. For example, leaders exaggerated the height of
their movements to allow followers to more easily recognize
the intended action target (Vesper and Richardson, 2014).
Similarly, leaders communicate the end-point of a grasping
action with the help of exaggerated kinematic parameters,
such as wrist height and grip aperture (Sacheli et al.,
2013).
Haptic Coupling
Information about another person’s action might also be
provided through the tactile channel. For instance, jointly
carrying a sofa allows mutual exchange of force information,
revealing co-actors’ movement direction or speed. Accordingly,
dyads who performed a joint pole-balancing task enhanced the
force feedback between each other to support smooth interaction
(van der Wel et al., 2011). Generally, touch can function as an
information channel when joint action partners are in physical
contact with each other. The ability to decode signals such as
emotional cues (Hertenstein et al., 2009) from close physical
interaction with their parents is a crucial aspect of children’s
development, establishing and regulating social encounters
(Feldman et al., 2003). Mother-infant tactile communication,
gaze, and emotional vocalization are found in all cultures and
societies, although cross-cultural research revealed that touch
plays a more important role for communication during play
and learning in traditional compared to Western societies
(Richter, 1995). Moreover, tactile communication is integral
to cultural practices such as dance and martial arts (Kimmel,
2009).
Multisensory Processing
Information processing in joint action is not limited to
only one sensory modality: when carrying a sofa together,
visual, auditory, and haptic sensory input is available,
facilitating, e.g., the prediction of a partner’s change in
movement direction. A recent study provides support for
the flexibility of multisensory processing: using a ‘sonification’
technique, in which kinematic movement parameters are
transformed into sound, it was shown that ‘sonified’ forces
and movement amplitudes on a rowing ergometer provide
sufficient information for listeners to predict a virtual boat’s
velocity and to reliably discriminate own actions from those
of other persons (Schmitz and Effenberg, 2012). Humans are
also able to integrate redundant information from multiple
sensory modalities, thereby enhancing the reliability and
precision of perception (Ernst and Banks, 2002; Wahn
and König, 2015, 2016). For instance, whilst the mirror
system is mostly understood as a visual system sensitive to
biological motion information, it is actually also tuned to
auditory (Kohler et al., 2002; Bidet-Caulet et al., 2005) and
audiovisual information (Lahav et al., 2007). Neuroimaging
evidence shows enhanced activation of most parts of the action
observation system (medial and superior temporal sulcus,
inferior parietal cortex, premotor regions, and subcortical
structures) when observing agents’ convergent compared to
divergent audiovisual movement patterns (Schmitz et al.,
2013).
Emotion Understanding and Expression
Sharing emotions with others provides motivational cues
helpful to initiate and continue joint tasks and to facilitate
coordination (Michael, 2011). Humans are capable of reading
others’ affective states from body movements, body posture,
gestures, facial expressions, and action performance, possibly via
activation of the observer’s corresponding states (Bastiaansen
et al., 2009; Borgomaneri et al., 2012). A two-system model
of emotional body language (de Gelder, 2006) distinguishes
between automatic, reflexes-based manifestations of an
emotional message and more deliberate emotional expression
based on reflection and decision-making. Together, these
efficiently provide information about others’ emotional states
and help establish and maintain joint action. For example,
having an uncooperative co-actor affected participants’
own response times (Hommel et al., 2009), suggesting that
people adjust their own behavior according to the perceived
affective states of others. Emotional body language also
plays a major role in art improvisations, such as contact
improvisation dance (Smith, 2014). Since improvisers explicitly
use input from their partners to develop their movement
interaction, this dance form allows performers to display
and experiment with inner states and emotional body
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language, which, in turn, influences the overall joint action
outcome.
GENERAL MECHANISMS SUPPORTING
COORDINATION
The following subsections introduce coordination mechanisms
that depend to a lesser degree on shared online information but
influence and support joint action more generally.
Coordination Smoothers
When shared perceptual information is scarce or unavailable,
‘coordination smoothers’ (Vesper et al., 2010) support joint
actions. One example is reducing the temporal variability of
one’s own actions, first identified in dyads who synchronized
the timing of key presses in a reaction time task (Vesper
et al., 2011). Co-actors’ responses were overall faster and less
variable in joint compared to individual performance and
variability reduction effectively improved coordination. A further
coordination smoother is the distribution of tasks between joint
action partners. In order to facilitate coordination, co-actors
who have a relatively easier task might adapt their actions in
a different way than those with a more difficult task (Vesper
et al., 2013; Skewes et al., 2015). For example, if a door
needs to be opened while carrying a sofa to another room,
it will be done by the actor who is closer to the door while
the other will momentarily take over more weight to provide
support.
Affordances
Affordances are action possibilities available to an agent in an
environment (Gibson, 1979). In the context of joint action,
information comes from the co-actor’s body or movements
and from the objects in the environment in which the
joint action takes place. On the one hand, ‘affordances for
another person’ specify co-actors’ action possibilities provided
by their particular abilities and the environment. For example,
based on the perceived relation between chair height and an
actor’s leg length, observers can distinguish between maximum
and preferred sitting heights of actors of different body
height (Stoffregen et al., 1999). Such information is useful
in understanding other agents (see Bach et al., 2014, for
a review on affordance in action observation) but can also
help to efficiently complement their behavior. On the other
hand, ‘affordances for joint action’ (or ‘joint affordances’)
concern actions available to multiple agents together. For
example, when dyads lifted wooden planks alone or together,
they transitioned between these two modes based on a
relational measure (the ratio of plank length and both persons’
mean arm span; Isenhower et al., 2010). Social affordances
might be directly perceived given that the information is
publicly available. Therefore, learning to perceive affordances
for others might be a natural consequence of learning to
perceive affordances for oneself (Mark, 2007). Consequently,
own capabilities and experiences play a role in perceiving
affordances for others (Ramenzoni et al., 2008), possibly
by activating one’s own motor system (Costantini et al.,
2011).
Conventions and Culture
Cultural and societal norms play a major role in regulating
behaviors, social encounters, and cooperation in groups by
providing conventions that can reliably guide individual
behavior. Generally, culture and conventions depend on
establishing and maintaining common ground between the
members of a group through shared experiences (Clark, 1996).
Culture is both a product of large-scale joint actions, such as
celebrations or protests, and it profoundly shapes how people
approach joint action in small-scale interpersonal encounters.
For example, if a person of a higher social rank performs a
joint task with their direct subordinate (e.g., an employer carries
the sofa together with an employee), coordination might be
influenced by the pre-existing power relation, the established
culture (e.g., favoring hierarchical or egalitarian communication;
Cheon et al., 2011) and the particular situational context (e.g.,
formal or informal). Joint actions involving people from different
cultural backgrounds are an interesting test case for studying
cooperation that is not regulated by the framework of a single
culture. Different cultures might promote conflicting approaches
to communication, decision making, and coordination (Boyd
and Richerson, 2009) and consider different amounts of personal
space, gaze, or tactile communication appropriate (Gudykunst
et al., 1988). For instance, people from East Asia would
typically bow for a formal greeting, whereas European people
would shake hands. This cultural difference may result in
a failure to perform the planned joint action of greeting
properly. Strategies to avoid such unsuccessful coordination,
e.g., adopting the partner’s cultural technique or establishing
a new ‘third-culture’ way, might be used in a variety of joint
tasks.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this article was to provide an overview of the
major cognitive, sensorimotor, affective, and cultural processes
supporting joint action. Given the extent of the phenomena
(from moving a sofa to playing in a musical ensemble) as
well as the variety of coordination mechanisms underlying
joint action (as introduced in this review), we postulate that
research on joint action needs to acknowledge the complex and
variable nature of this social phenomenon. Consequently, future
psychological, cognitive, and neuroscientific research might (1)
integrate different lines of research in ecologically valid tasks,
(2) specify the relative contribution of particular coordination
mechanisms and contextual factors, and (3) set the grounds for
an overarching framework that explains how co-actors plan and
perform joint actions.
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